Current and upcoming projects:
A Very Practical Ethics of Humor
My book A Very Practical Ethics of Humor is the culmination of the work I have done on the ethics of humor over the last five years. In the book I make the case that comedy is not an ethical free-for-all and that, in fact, there is such a thing as a morally bad joke; that the insincerity of comedy nevertheless gives joke-sharers the moral right to say things they would never be permitted to say sincerely; that there are no entire topics that ought to simply be ‘off-limits’ for joking; and that the nature of wrongdoing in comedy is often to do with callous disregard for the reputation of social groups. Each chapter of the book focuses on a real-world instance of humor which has caused popular controversy, such as Will Smith’s attack on Chris Rock at the 2022 Oscars, or Dave Chappelle’s jokes at the expense of trans people. A Very Practical Ethics of Humor is written in lively, readable English, and is pitched towards educated non-academic readers as well as philosophers.
Previous proceedings from my work on humor ethics have been published in The Journal of Value Inquiry, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, and Hypatia, as well as The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Aesthetics.
“When Technology Helps, and When It Does Not.”
In which I propose that many of the modern world’s most pressing problems stem from the fact that a decent but infallible rule-of-thumb – “human lives are improved by access to impressive and powerful computational technology” – has been treated by captains of industry as if it is an absolutely bulletproof aphorism. I envision a framework for discussing the capabilities of emerging technology which instead focuses on the tangible ways in which it improves human welfare, and – with reference to established philosophical literature on the nature of exploitation – warn against the assumption that offering people new options necessarily improves their lives. At the same time, I also challenge the reactionary attitude that modern technology has impoverished the life of the average person, making the case that the human tendency towards noticing urgently bad news to a greater degree than gradual improvements in wellbeing has given an inaccurate impression that modern life is unusually difficult. Both zealots and critics of advancements such as Artificial Intelligence fail to acknowledge that small, technology-enabled conveniences can make huge contributions to overall human preference-satisfaction.
“Because It Is Difficult: Artificial Intelligence and Human Creativity.”
Although it is difficult to predict precisely which human skills will end up being valued less or more in a future shaped by now-novel technologies, it is easy to foresee the general 'shape' of that value: we will prize the ability of human beings to do things that cannot be done easily, either with the help of that technology or without it. Much as the world of fine art came to place less value on photorealistic recreations of real-world objects following the rise of easily-accessible photography, in the medium-term future we are likely to see a drop in the perceived value of human talents that are easily mimicked by Large Language Models - but not, I argue, in the value of human talent generally.
“To VAR or Not To VAR? The Problem with Technology-Assisted Refereeing.”
The primary value of soccer derives from its capacity for entertainment. As such, the rules of the sport are of instrumental, aesthetic value: the existence of a set of rules allows for the establishment of a game that non-participants can understand and enjoy. In everyday conversations surrounding the sport, however, the rules are almost universally misunderstood as having intrinsic, moral value, such that their more rigorous enforcement must be an automatic, ceteris paribus good. I debunk this common belief, and note its relevance to discussions, popular in recent years, surrounding the adoption of Video Assistant Refereeing technology. Because these debates assume that fairer decisions are always desirable, their prevailing direction is towards ever more sophisticated technology to help prevent refereeing oversights. If we begin with the view that changes to sports’ rules should ultimately make them more entertaining, we can weigh the benefits and disadvantages fairly – and open ourselves to considering more radical rule changes that increase popular sports’ aesthetic value.
“Resentment, Forgiveness, and The Limits of Apology.”
Amongst scholars interested in the concept of forgiveness, one challenge has been to explain how a person can simultaneously believe that she has been wronged and foreswear resentment against the wrongdoer. One strategy has been to hold that resentment is a form of protest against the demeaning message sent by an act of wrongdoing – a protest that can be abandoned when the wrongdoer apologizes, thereby retracting the message. But this idea implies that failing to forgive a repentant wrongdoer is always irrational. This is a problem: for very serious transgressions, it is perfectly reasonable for a wronged party never to forgive her wrongdoer. Some modern accounts of forgiveness overcome this issue by replacing the concept of a demeaning message with that of a negative change in the relevant interpersonal relationship. I believe this is a promising avenue, but that, so far, theories of this kind have failed to offer sufficient detail about what type of change in relationship is relevant. I establish the relevant change as being between a relationship in which the wrongdoing in question can, and cannot, be characterized as an aberration.
“Regarding the Ethical Permission to Use Self-Directed Slurs.”
One of the puzzles tackled by philosophers of slurs is the question of how a derogatory word can be reclaimed or reappropriated by members of the group to whom it refers. Answers to this question have typically involved the idea that group members do not have, and are not transmitting, pejorative views of their own group when they use slurs. But these answers cannot account for the fact that members of targeted groups have an uncommonly robust right to the use of slurs, even when they do intend to communicate such views. In this article I set out the desideratum for an account of slurs to acknowledge this fact, and propose a theory of slur-appropriation that has to do with the ethical relevance of a person’s lived experiences.
A Very Practical Ethics of Humor
My book A Very Practical Ethics of Humor is the culmination of the work I have done on the ethics of humor over the last five years. In the book I make the case that comedy is not an ethical free-for-all and that, in fact, there is such a thing as a morally bad joke; that the insincerity of comedy nevertheless gives joke-sharers the moral right to say things they would never be permitted to say sincerely; that there are no entire topics that ought to simply be ‘off-limits’ for joking; and that the nature of wrongdoing in comedy is often to do with callous disregard for the reputation of social groups. Each chapter of the book focuses on a real-world instance of humor which has caused popular controversy, such as Will Smith’s attack on Chris Rock at the 2022 Oscars, or Dave Chappelle’s jokes at the expense of trans people. A Very Practical Ethics of Humor is written in lively, readable English, and is pitched towards educated non-academic readers as well as philosophers.
Previous proceedings from my work on humor ethics have been published in The Journal of Value Inquiry, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, and Hypatia, as well as The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Aesthetics.
“When Technology Helps, and When It Does Not.”
In which I propose that many of the modern world’s most pressing problems stem from the fact that a decent but infallible rule-of-thumb – “human lives are improved by access to impressive and powerful computational technology” – has been treated by captains of industry as if it is an absolutely bulletproof aphorism. I envision a framework for discussing the capabilities of emerging technology which instead focuses on the tangible ways in which it improves human welfare, and – with reference to established philosophical literature on the nature of exploitation – warn against the assumption that offering people new options necessarily improves their lives. At the same time, I also challenge the reactionary attitude that modern technology has impoverished the life of the average person, making the case that the human tendency towards noticing urgently bad news to a greater degree than gradual improvements in wellbeing has given an inaccurate impression that modern life is unusually difficult. Both zealots and critics of advancements such as Artificial Intelligence fail to acknowledge that small, technology-enabled conveniences can make huge contributions to overall human preference-satisfaction.
“Because It Is Difficult: Artificial Intelligence and Human Creativity.”
Although it is difficult to predict precisely which human skills will end up being valued less or more in a future shaped by now-novel technologies, it is easy to foresee the general 'shape' of that value: we will prize the ability of human beings to do things that cannot be done easily, either with the help of that technology or without it. Much as the world of fine art came to place less value on photorealistic recreations of real-world objects following the rise of easily-accessible photography, in the medium-term future we are likely to see a drop in the perceived value of human talents that are easily mimicked by Large Language Models - but not, I argue, in the value of human talent generally.
“To VAR or Not To VAR? The Problem with Technology-Assisted Refereeing.”
The primary value of soccer derives from its capacity for entertainment. As such, the rules of the sport are of instrumental, aesthetic value: the existence of a set of rules allows for the establishment of a game that non-participants can understand and enjoy. In everyday conversations surrounding the sport, however, the rules are almost universally misunderstood as having intrinsic, moral value, such that their more rigorous enforcement must be an automatic, ceteris paribus good. I debunk this common belief, and note its relevance to discussions, popular in recent years, surrounding the adoption of Video Assistant Refereeing technology. Because these debates assume that fairer decisions are always desirable, their prevailing direction is towards ever more sophisticated technology to help prevent refereeing oversights. If we begin with the view that changes to sports’ rules should ultimately make them more entertaining, we can weigh the benefits and disadvantages fairly – and open ourselves to considering more radical rule changes that increase popular sports’ aesthetic value.
“Resentment, Forgiveness, and The Limits of Apology.”
Amongst scholars interested in the concept of forgiveness, one challenge has been to explain how a person can simultaneously believe that she has been wronged and foreswear resentment against the wrongdoer. One strategy has been to hold that resentment is a form of protest against the demeaning message sent by an act of wrongdoing – a protest that can be abandoned when the wrongdoer apologizes, thereby retracting the message. But this idea implies that failing to forgive a repentant wrongdoer is always irrational. This is a problem: for very serious transgressions, it is perfectly reasonable for a wronged party never to forgive her wrongdoer. Some modern accounts of forgiveness overcome this issue by replacing the concept of a demeaning message with that of a negative change in the relevant interpersonal relationship. I believe this is a promising avenue, but that, so far, theories of this kind have failed to offer sufficient detail about what type of change in relationship is relevant. I establish the relevant change as being between a relationship in which the wrongdoing in question can, and cannot, be characterized as an aberration.
“Regarding the Ethical Permission to Use Self-Directed Slurs.”
One of the puzzles tackled by philosophers of slurs is the question of how a derogatory word can be reclaimed or reappropriated by members of the group to whom it refers. Answers to this question have typically involved the idea that group members do not have, and are not transmitting, pejorative views of their own group when they use slurs. But these answers cannot account for the fact that members of targeted groups have an uncommonly robust right to the use of slurs, even when they do intend to communicate such views. In this article I set out the desideratum for an account of slurs to acknowledge this fact, and propose a theory of slur-appropriation that has to do with the ethical relevance of a person’s lived experiences.